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INESSENTIALLY SPEAKING as THERE 
POLITICS AFI'ER POSTMODERNISM?) 
Allan C. Hutchinson* 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE. By Martha Minow. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 1990. Pp. xii, 403. $29.95. 
Although we need to use gender-related ideas in order to challenge 
gender constraints, we will only be able to accomplish that objective by 
constantly re-examining the ideas we are using. Ultimately, in order to 
challenge gender constraints effectively, our use of gender-related ideas 
must change with our shifting cultural context and the changes within 
ourselves. Only by continually re-thinking who we are and why we are 
making the choices we ma_ke can we free ourselves from the belief that 
our selves are constructed by our sexual identities. 
- Mary Joe Frug1 
Twilight is upon us. As the contemporary continuance of the En-
lightenment project, modernity has had its day. Its erstwhile champi-
ons' efforts to establish a combination of auth~nticity and authority as 
the ground for Truth and Justice - that individuals can only give 
meaning and value to their own lives by locating and expressing their 
own self-identity - have proved to be misplaced. A modernist deliv-
erance from doubt and uncertainty remains a tantalizing, but receding 
prospect. The sun of Truth is unfailingly hazy and in danger of total 
eclipse, resembling more a fading battery of artful :floodlights. Every-
thing loses its iridescence and is reduced to a dull pastiche of bland on 
bland. In a way of speaking, Minerva's owl has flown the philosophi-
cal coop entirely.2 No longer taking its crepuscular flights of fancy, 
Wisdom's bird has abandoned W estem attempts to locate a fixed 
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. LL.B. (Hons.) (1974), London Uni-
versity; LL.M. Manchester (1978). -Ed. I am grateful to Brenda Cossman, Lisa Fishbayn, 
Blair Holder, Carol Smart, and Mark Warner for sharing their work and their insights. with me. 
1. Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. 
REv. 1065, 1140 (1985). In her life anq in her writings, Mary Joe Frug represented the rigorous 
practice and the exhilarating promise of postmodernism. As part of the feminist project of chal· 
lenging the extensive and complicated network of sociocultural practices that legitimate the sub-
ordination of women, she paid constant attention to the gendered and situated power of 
discourse. Always with genuine warmth and humor, she refused to accept the imperialistic 
claims of many radical scholars and resisted the easy politi\:king of modeqiism. M. Frug, Rescu· 
ing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 21 (Mar. 31, 
1989) (unpublished manuscript). In her personal and professional life, she demonstrated that, far 
from being depolitical, postmodernism is the best and most effective way to be political. It is to 
her happy memory and joyful example that this essay is dedicated. 
2. See G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1-13 (T. Knox trans. 1945). 
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flightpath by which to understand and guide human experience. 
Knowledge seems to be only the fleeting trace of the will to power and 
understanding is irretrievably in cahoots with oppression. As its joy-
less archaeologist, Michel Foucault has written Enlightenment's fitting 
epitaph: "knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for 
cutting."3 
I. THE POSTMODERN PUZZLE 
For many observers, this modernist failure marks the beginning of 
the end. With much anguish, it is lamented that humanity is fast go-
ing to an existential hell in a nihilistic handcart. However, a strong 
band of critical scholars has resisted that apocalyptic appraisal. These 
scholars have sought to seize this particular moment by turning mod-
ernism's dusk into postmodernism's dawn: it is an opening and not a 
closing of opportunities. Recognizing that critical success has its own 
limitations and responsibilities, they resist the temptation to reach for 
higher ground than their own theoretical challenges permit. As the 
obituarists of Truth and Grand Theory, they are scrupulous to ensure 
that any efforts at normative reconstruction do not transgress the im-
peratives of deconstructive criticism, whose critical force they must 
respect. Deconstruction is an unforgiving and remorseless 
taskmaster. 4 
For all its deconstructive verve, postmodernism is alleged not only 
to render the practice of reconstructive politics difficult, but to sabo-
tage any coherent program of progressive politics. Deconstruction un-
dercuts politics and politics marginalizes deconstruction. 
Nevertheless, I intend to argue that there is no contradiction between 
a continuing loyalty to a postmodern strategy and the practical reali-
zation of a radical political agenda. 5 The postmodern challenge is to 
open a space for a modus vivendi that is neither misguidedly essential-
ist in theory nor hopelessly historicist in practice. In short, I claim 
that a postmodern approach to law is both textually viable and politi-
cally radical; it is not oxymoronic or naive to be both postmodern and 
progressive. Postmodernism is not the ground for a progressive poli-
tics, but a complementary strategy for one. 
In the jurisprudential comer of postmodern scholarship, the work 
3. M. FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, CoUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 154 (D. Bouchard ed. 1977). 
4. See A. HUTCHINSON, Working the Seam: Truth, Justice and the Foucault Way, in 
DWELLING ON THE THRESHOLD: CRrriCAL EssAYS ON MODERN LEGAL THOUGHT 261-94 
(1988). 
5. See Binder, Radicalism Deconstructed, 69 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 1991); Hunt, The 
Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodemism, 35 McGILL L.J. 507 (1990). Of course, postmodem-
ism is far from the monolithic tendency that I have suggested. Although its protagonists share a 
general orientation, it is a fluid and protean line of critique and politics. See infra notes 9-12, 25-
37 and accompanying text. 
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of Martha Minow deserves especial attention. Her Making All The 
Difference offers an excellent occasion for working through the puzzles 
and strategies of postmodern politics. Infused with a postmodern per-
spective, her writing stands at the frontiers of modem legal thinking in 
its efforts to reject and move beyond the modernist project of jurispru-
dence. In its searching analysis and imaginative proposals, Making All 
the Difference is a book to be reckoned with - it makes a difference. 
This review sketches the postmodern problematic, and canvasses Mi-
now's engagement with the dilemma of difference. Addressing her 
treatment of power, the review then offers the outline of a postmodern 
politics and traces its implications for legal activity. The conclusion 
points to the difficulty of all that has gone before and places it in 
parentheses. 
II. IMPERIAL INTIMATIONS 
through they're own words I they will be exposed 
they've got a severe case of I the emperors new clothes. 
- Sinead O'Connor6 
Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale of The Emperor's New 
Clothes has done stalwart work for deconstructive critics of jurispru-
dential pretension and legal obfuscation.7 It is a beguiling fable of 
common credulity, scholarly complicity, and innocent exposure. Like 
the law, the emperor is only sustained in his majesty by the willingness 
of his subjects to suspend their common sense and to see what they 
were expected to see. With the innocent clarity of a child, the critic 
informs the gullible people that the emperor is naked. Exposed but 
undaunted, the emperor/law "walked even more proudly and the two 
gentleman of the imperial bedchamber[lawyers] went on carrying the 
train that wasn't there."8 Consequently, despite the ingenuity of the 
juristic couturiers of right, law stands debagged and debunked in its 
bare essentials of might. It is a tale intended to chastise the conspira-
torial and congratulate the contumacious. 
But, on the insistence of the postmodernist impulse, the time has 
come to abandon Andersen's tale as a critical trope. Like most meta-
phors, its telling begins in openness and its denouement ends in clo-
sure. As context changes, its critical message reveals more about the 
critics than about those being criticized. The tale lends itself too easily 
to the interpretive ministrations of the modernists. It suggests that, 
once th~ wardrobe of conventional costume is dispensed with, power 
6. O'Connor, The Emperor's New Clothes, I Do NOT WANT WHAT I HAVEN'T GOT (Ensign 
Chrysalis Records 1990). 
7. See, for example, D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Legal Decision?, 43 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 513, 536-38 (1989). 
8. H. ANDERSEN, The Emperor's New Clothes, in THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES AND STO-
RIES 81 (E. Haugaard trans. 1974). 
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and people will be viewed and understood in their unadorned reality: 
all will be free to speak truth to the world and to apprehend the true 
nature of things. For the modernist, knowledge is available and ascer-
tainable, but only outside and independent of power's corrupting influ-
ence. Behind or underneath the skewed truths and perceived realities 
of historical living lie the Truth and Reality of Life. The tale's mod-
ernist appropriation moralizes in terms of ontological retrieval and 
political reclamation; it is about finding ourselves rather than remak-
ing ourselves. 
In contrast to the modernists' preoccupation with essences and es-
sentials, the postmodern temper has no eternal truth to offer and no 
immutable knowledge to dispense; it accepts the historically situated 
and socially constructed character of truths and knowledges. It does 
not seek to apprehend a fixed and given at-oneness, but to encourage a 
contingent complex of multiple realities. 9 By denying the possibility of 
a perfectible meta-narrative or a totalizing intelligibility, it concedes 
the existence of neither eternal difference nor everlasting undifferentia-
tion and puts everything into perpetual parentheses. As such, 
postmodernism is a dynamic thesaurus of experiential values, not a 
technical manual of scientific methodology; difference is evanescent 
and mobile. 10 It is a rigorous and uncompromising discourse of 
nonessentialism that offers no grand theory of emancipation. There 
are many narratives, but no meta-narrative. Postmodernism simply 
dares people to walk the high wire of life without a metaphysical safety 
net for the occasional loss of balance or nerve. 
As such, the naked body of the emperor is one more construction 
to be deconstructed and law is one more conjunction of power and 
knowledge to be explored. Neither the human nor legal body will ever 
present itself for inspection in its unmediated self-presence; there is no 
lost presence to be restored and no lasting judgment of the past in the 
name of a present truth. The political gaze fixes the body as body and 
law as law. For the postmodern critic, power both produces and is 
produced by knowledge. Knowledge, in turn, enables the claim to 
truth to be made that legitimates that same power and knowledge. 
Truth is always and already situated within the contexts of power and 
knowledge that it claims to validate. 11 All strategies are risky and all 
consequences are unpredictable: everything will depend on the in-
forming context and precise timing of any particular intervention. ' 
9. See Coombe, Room for: Manoeuvre: Toward a Theory of Practice in Critical Legal Studies, 
14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 69 (1989); Fraser & Nicholson, Social Criticism without Philosophy: An 
Encounter between Feminism and Postmodemism, in FEMINJSM/POSTMODERNJSM 19-38 (L. 
Nicholson ed. 1990). 
10. See D. Fuss, EssENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE & DIFFERENCE (1989). 
11. See A. HUTCHINSON, supra note 4, at 261-94; Smart, Law'.\- Power, The Sexed Body, and 
Feminist Discourse, 17 J.L. & Soc. 194 (1990). 
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The challenge, therefore, for postmodern jurists is to ensure that 
they do not march on another long day's journey into night. As well 
as guarding against postmodernism becoming its own meta-narrative, 
they must effect a viable practical posture that allows them to accom-
modate and respond to the double bind in which their theoretical affili-
ations place them. Nothing is outside history and change: everything 
is constructed and contestable, including and especially politics. The 
postmodern insight undermines monolithic and stultifying claims to 
authority and truth derived from a universal reason and opens up a 
space for transformative action. While it does not provide any 
blueprint for change or enlightenment, it does allow individuals to de-
cide what world and what "me" they wish to make or remake based 
on experiential truths: postmodernism allows them to empower and 
affirm their proclaimed selfness with value and legitimacy. In 
postmodern parlance, critics must strive to be responsible strangers in 
their own native land. While "we can pronounce not a single destruc-
tive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the 
logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to con-
testL] we cannot give up this complicity without also giving up the 
critique we are directing against this complicity."12 
In charting the sustaining and contested interrelationships of truth, 
power, and knowledge, the question of politics is always insinuated 
and implicated. Any analytical devices used to understand or evaluate 
history are themselves always and already part of that politics. 
Caught within this fundamental triangulation, those hostile to 
postmodernism insist that it is caught between a rock and a hard place 
in its efforts to sustain and sanction a progressive practice of trans-
formative politics. It is argued that the Critics either must abandon 
the deconstructive method that bloots the progressive edge of their 
political program and fall back on a variant of the discredited formal-
ism, 13 or they must forsake the radical political agenda that cramps 
their deconstructive verve and resign themselves to a reluctant stance 
of political quietism.14 Consequently, despite their radical protesta-
tions, postmodernists' deconstructive efforts are dismissed as futile and 
reactionary because they "cannot help but bring comfort, energy, and 
ideas to the enemy of change."15 
The long and short of it, to listen to the detractors, is that the 
postmodernists' attachment to a deconstructive mode of critique is in-
12. J. DERRIDA, WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 280-81 (A. Bass trans. 1978). 
13. See Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296 (1990). 
14. See generally F. KERMODE, AN APPETITE FOR POETRY (1989); Hunt, supra note 5. 
15. F. LENTRICCHIA, ARIEL AND THE POLICE 131 (1988). For similar charges of decon-
struction's conservatism, see T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 132 
(1983); J. HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY (F. Lawrence trans. 
1987); E. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT, AND THE CRmc 193, 242-43 (1983). 
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compatible with their reconstructive aspiration to a truly progressive 
program of transformative politics - if everything is always open to 
interpretation, how do we know what is and is not progressive? By 
proceeding on their campaign of critical terrorism and razing all tex-
tual strategies before them, postmodernists, it is contended, retain no 
place from which to launch or justify their own positive proposals for 
social change: how can they ground their own critique, if there is no 
ground on which to stand? In denying all claims to truth and neutral-
ity, critics deny their own capacity to make evaluative or uncontro-
vertible claims: How can critique transcend its own injunction against 
transcendence? If a formally coherent and substantively realizable 
legal order is impossible, there will be no legal system against which to 
mount a political critique or against which to work for progressive 
change. If law does not have any definite contours or shape, how can 
its shape or contours be good or bad?16 
It is against the backdrop of this problem that Minow's work in 
law and politics must be understood and assessed. Her focus is the 
dilemma of difference, but she uses it as a window on the .most punish-
ing questions on the postmodern agenda in terms of race and gender. 
In particular, she asks: How it is possible to speak in meaningful and 
cogent ways about race, gender, or difference, if any knowledge or un-
derstanding is socially constructed, historically positioned, and politi-
cally partial? 
III. MINOW MOVES 
Categorization is the boon and bane of human existence. While 
the ability to name and label the world is necessary in order to bring it 
down to manageable and meaningful proportions, the act of so doing 
ensures that there can never be an unmediated view or participation in 
reality. The taxonomic tendency is never value-free, but always situ-
ated within a larger normative universe; it is less a matter of technical 
refinement and more a case of creative designation. 17 In this way, un-
derstanding is always a form of misunderstanding and seeing is always 
a kind of blindness. The process of labeling and naming is particularly 
fraught with difficulties and dangers when it concerns people. While 
aspirations to treat everyone similarly overlook genuine differences be-
tween people and trivialize each person's uniqueness, the tendency to 
treat everyone differently ignores the sameness of people and fails to 
respect each person's humanity. To categorize is to choose and, in so 
16. See, for example, Cassman, A Matter of Difference: Domestic Contracts and Gender 
Equality, 28 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 303 (1990); Duclos, Lessons of Difference: Feminist Theory on 
Cultural Diversity, 38 BUFFALO L. REV. 325 (1990). 
17. See Cohen & Hutchinson, Of Persons and Property: The Politics of Legal Taxonomy, 21 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 20 (1990). 
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doing, there is no escaping the responsibility of judgment or its context 
of power. 
A crucial setting for studying the dilemma is law. Not only does 
law comprise a potent vocabulary for assigning and locating differ-
ence, it imposes itself coercively on the lives of those who come within 
its embrace: "Law backs up words and concepts with power" (p. 97). 
It is the burden of Minow's book to explore the ways in which the law 
articulates, confronts, and responds to the dilemma of difference. As 
the social medium and forum par excellence for constructing and en-
forcing difference, law provides a convenient lens through which to 
examine critically the production and interaction of power and knowl-
edge. By deconstructing the limiting and limited assumptions of pres-
ent legal practice, Minow strives to. glimpse and act upon its 
reconstructive potential. Despite the current failings of the legal sys-
tem, Minow maintains that it is possible to transform rather than trash 
law so that, suitably rejigged and reoriented, it can make all the differ-
ence in the continual struggle to turn difference into a source of pride 
and not a mark of discrimination. 
In working towards this progressive program of legal change, Mi-
now begins by highlighting five closely related, but unstated, assump-
tions that inform and energize existing legal understandings of the 
difference dilemma (pp. 50-74). First, differences are treated as intrin-
sic rather than as expressions of comparison between people; it is the 
person who is labeled different rather than her or his relation to 
others. Second, the point of reference from which the assessment of 
difference is made remains unstated; this gives the distinct impression 
that the norm of judgment is inevitable and natural. Third, the person 
judging difference is thought of as having no perspective rather than as 
having a particular situated perspective; that a perspective is widely 
shared does not make it any less of a perspective. Fourth, the perspec-
tive of those being judged as different is treated as irrelevant or already 
accounted for by that perspective; a person's perspective or self-under-
standing is thought of as unrelated to how others react or judge. Fi-
nally, it is assumed that existing social and economic arrangements are 
natural and neutral; any departure from the status quo runs the risk of 
partiality and interference with the free choice of individuals. In total, 
the collective force of these unstated assumptions is to make the differ-
ence dilemma seem inevitable and irresolvable: "Noticing difference 
and ignoring it both recreate difference; both can threaten such goals 
as neutrality, equality, and freedom" (p. 74). 
Having identified the sources of difference, Minow proceeds to 
canvass the prevailing theoretical models available from which to con-
struct a convincing and workable response to the difference dilemma. 
Although her treatment of these alternatives is informed and sensitive, 
she gives short shrift to contemporary legal theories and their reforma-
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tive claims {pp. 146-72). In its own particular way, each of the theo-
ries that she canvasses tends to rely on one of two traditional 
approaches. One is the abnormal-person approach, which situates the 
problem of difference within a simplistic either/or construction and 
thereby defeats any possibility of its resolution. By treating differences 
as intrinsic, it makes the different person into the problem and as-
sumes difference to be obvious and natural. This approach denies that 
there is some perspective or norm against which difference is perceived 
and measured: "The perspective of those who have been named 'dif-
ferent' is thought to be inconceivable- and irrelevant" {p. 215). The 
other is the rights-based approach, which recognize$ the judgmental 
nature of differences, but persists in maintaining the idea of a viable 
distinction between normal and abnormal and in perpetuating its legal 
consequences. While more tailored and situation-specific solutions to 
problems of difference are possible, rights analysis leaves untouched 
the larger and objectionable patterns of power distribution that rein-
force the nature of differences as static and rooted: "[Rights analysis] 
offers little insight into how an observer constructs what is 'real' and 
poses a special dilemma for those whose differences seem 'real' against 
the backdrop of social institutions and practices that make that differ-
ence matter" {p. 216). 
In place of these unsophisticated and constraining responses, Mi-
now offers a relational approach that takes seriously the epistemologi-
cal and political ramifications of the difference dilemma: "If the 
problem has relational dimensions, then so should the solutions" {p. 
90). While drawing selectively from a host of disciplinary insights, she 
relies extensively on the philosophical and practical imperatives of 
feminist literature {pp. 192-214). The central thrust of the relational 
approach is that difference is a function of actual relationships be-
tween people and social practices; the attribution of difference is the 
result of a comparison drawn between an individual and a normative 
standard that is constructed and relied upon by other individuals. 
Such an approach eschews elevating abstract concerns over concrete 
experience; it comprehends personhood as based on autonomy and 
separateness for caring and thinks about relationships as natural, fixed, 
and immutable: "[P]eople live and talk in relationships and never ex-
ist outside them" (p. 111). By treating difference as part of a historical 
context of social relations, Minow's preferred approach insists that, as 
difference is always a negotiated and constructed notion of practice, it 
can be renegotiated and reconstructed: 
A relational approach, like the abnormal-persons approach, assumes 
that people live within networks of relationships; but unlike the abnor-
mal-persons view, it challenges fixed status and attributed difference. 
And unlike rights analysis, the relational approach inquires into the in-
stitutional practices to determine the norm against which some people 
seem different, or deviant. Also unlike rights analysis, relational ideas 
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raise questions about how anyone knows and how the observers' rela-
tionship to the observed influences what they think they know. By 
stressing the unavoidability of perspective, the relational approach 
makes all claims of knowledge vulnerable to the. same charge: "But 
that's just your view." It encourages more debate and highlights as 
human choices - rather than acts of discovery - the way we treat peo-
ple, the traits we call "different," and the social institutions that embody 
and reinforce those assumptions. To address relationships is to resist 
obstruction and to demand context. [p. 216] 
To operationalize the relational approach in the struggle to meet 
the dilemma of difference, Minow chooses to reclaim the voice of 
rights talk by reconstituting and revitalizing it in accordance with a 
relational dynamic. Junking the notion of rights as a set of fixed and 
abstract claims, she wants to revalorize it as a conversational discourse 
through which to establish community in the struggle for meaning. 
Detached from extant protocols of power, a concrete and expansive 
version of rights talk can empower the marginal at the same time it 
challenges the status quo. While Minow's defense of rights celebrates 
rather than condemns their lack of neutrality, she seeks to nurture the 
overlooked possibility that rights claims demand "an equality of atten-
tion" and their exercise "sustains the call that makes those in power at 
least listen" (p. 297; emphasis omitted). In short, notwithstanding the 
traditional hazards and the obvious pitfalls, "[t]here is something too 
valuable in the aspiration of rights, and something too neglectful of the 
power imbedded in assertions of another's need, to abandon the rheto-
ric of rights" (p. 307). 
IV. RECOVERING POWER 
In its ambitious sweep and persistent sophistication, Minow's book 
is the rare publication thf!t produces a lucid and telling analysis of a 
problem whose present understandmg and future resolution tend to 
elude even the most sensitive and thoughtful people. Having read this 
book, it is impossible not to think and respond t9 the dilemma of dif-
ference differently. By providing a ne"' vocabulary with which to talk 
about difference, she assures that the problem of difference is trans-
formed in the attempt to resolve it. The book's particular strength is 
the facility with which it moves between the exacting spheres of meta-
theorizing and the practical details of concrete problems. Exhibiting a 
prodigious erudition, Minow follows her own central injunction 'al-
ways to respect and engage contexts in her situated and courageous 
efforts to address discrimination in Native American land claims, bi-
lingual education, maternity leave, housing for mentally handicapped, 
and the employment of African Americans.18 
18. My use of "African American" instead of "black" is deliberate. Africans, including 
those from the continent and those in the diaspora, have been labeled by Europeans since their 
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Perhaps because of this enviable insistence on practical relevance 
and strategic significance, Minow does not attend as closely as she 
might to the postmodern puzzles suggested by her text: she responds 
to them only implicitly and indirectly. However, any approach that 
takes such an uncompromising and rigorous stand on the constructed 
and contextualized nature of all difference must confront the dilemma 
of how we know which differences count and how we validate such 
knowledge. This puts the issues of power and subordination firmly on 
the postmodern agenda: it ensures that the discussions of difference 
are about racism as much as race, and about sexism as much as gen-
der. Although Minow is never dismissive or indifferent to the 
problems of power (pp. 229, 237, 381, 389), she does not elaborate 
fully the basis on which her own brand of postmodemism makes this 
challenge. In short, Minow is long on the skeptical nature of truth 
and knowledge, but short on the political problem of power; she at-
tends to only two sides of the triangle of knowledge, truth, and power. 
Accordingly, I intend to concentrate on how postmodemism can 
be theoretically consistent and remain politically compelling in con-
fronting the ubiquity of power. How can postmodemism confront 
subordination without suborning itself in the process? My account is 
offered not so much as a hostile corrective to Minow's shortcomings, 
but as a supportive supplement to her more practical efforts. Nonethe-
less, my argument does suggest that Minow should reconsider some of 
her institutional strategies and adopt a more radical program of 
change. By giving insufficient weight in her analysis to power's effects, 
she leaves the impression that discrimination is more a matter of cog-
nitive misperception than a political practice of subordination. A 
closer attention to power's insidious presence and operation will re-
store a keener political edge to the postmodern project. In short, I 
want to combine Martha Minow's insights with those of Catharine 
original contact thousands of years ago- "nigger," "negro," "colored," and "black" to mention 
a few. Each of these are European-imposed terms and focus only on skin color. Now, for the 
first time Africans in the diaspora are beginning to rename and reclaim themselves and their 
collective culture respectively with the name "African American." See M. KARENGA, THE AF-
RICAN-AMERICAN HOLIDAY OF KWANZAA: A CELEBRATION OF FAMILY AND CULTURE 
(1989). The term allows, in fact requires, an identification with a culture, language expression, 
geography, and a history that denies the oppressive reduction of African Americans to a color 
only. Many scholars and other people of African descent recognize this as a movement-in-the-
positive: liberation arising through self-definition and self-determination by way of an affirma· 
tion of consciousness and identity. From a postmodern perspective, "African American" empha· 
sizes appropriately the organic idea of culture, not a static notion of physiological essence. The 
use of "white European" in place of "white" serves a similar function. Of course, an African-
American or white European identity is not a monolithic entity, but is itself constituted through 
difference and diversity. Furthermore, the problem of race and racism is not represented solely 
by the engagement between African Americans and white Europeans. My focus on African-
American oppression is only one, albeit widespread, manifestation of the problem. In contempo-
rary North America, there are many sites and settings for racism among different cultural 
groups. 
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MacK.innon.19 Whereas Minow can check the essentialist tendencies 
of MacKinnon, MacK.innon can provide the political radicalness that 
Minow intimates, but ultimately shies away from. 
In her pioneering work, Catharine MacK.innon has more than any 
other scholar insisted upon the sustaining connection between episte-
mological framework and political power; the ability of the male point 
of view to appropriate the standpoint of neutrality and objectivity has 
been crucial to the project of institutional patriarchy. However, in her 
efforts to emphasize the reinforcing relation between power and 
knowledge, MacK.innon has fallen victim to the modernist contagion. 
Rather than recognize the contingent and constructed character of 
women's experience, she runs perilously close to grounding her analy-
sis of women's oppression in a notion of "essential womanhood." She 
presupposes a presocial, supracultural, and free woman who, laboring 
under false consciousness, is constantly trying to throw off the yoke of 
male domination. Her text and critique is structured around the idea 
of "women's point of view" and "women's voice"; the ambition is to 
give women really what they want and "on [their] own terms."20 
The effect of this essentializing tendency is to rob, not imbue, the 
work of its radical potential. It inadvertently reinforces the essentialist 
epistemology of the traditional thinking that it condemns and seeks to 
dislodge; it recovers women's subjugated knowledge as a corrective to 
the partial and selective truths of male thinking. So hegemonic and 
systemic is the male perspective in the MacKinnon scheme of things 
- "women exist[] in a context of terror"21 - that women only fea-
ture as perennial victims and authentication is reserved only for the 
experience of subordination. Apart from other things, this epistemo-
logical approach is invalidated by MacK.innon's own writing, for if the 
male perspective is so pervasive, what can validate MacK.innon's own 
analysis and what is the "true" experience that is sublimated by false 
consciousness? By downplaying the important intersections of class, 
race, and sexual orientation, she risks reducing "woman" to a neces-
sary and natural category that is as much the root of the sexist prob-
lem as it is the seed for the feminist solution.22 Her account is almost 
so flat, static, and all-embracing that there is no space or opening from 
19. See c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1986); c. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). Minow mentions, but does not grapple with, the 
challenge of MacKinnon to Minow's own brand of critique. Pp. 50, 217. 
20. c. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 19, at 88, 160, 195, 83 & 22 (em-
phasis omitted); Colker, Feminism, Sexuality and Self: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of 
Authenticity (Book Review), 68 B.U. L. REv. 217 (1988). 
21. c. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINISf THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 19, at 151; 
see also A. DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE (1987); Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference 
Method Makes (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. REv. 751 (1989). 
22. See Harris, Categorical Discourse and Dominist Theory (Book Review), 5 BERKELEY 
WOMEN'S L.J. 181 (1990). 
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which to launch any transformative action: she can only chronicle the 
sources and strategies of victimization rather than provide explana-
tions that themselves can become forms and founts of resistance.23 
Domination becomes a seamless web that is total in its intelligibility 
and, being bereft of complexity and contradiction, is exclusionary in 
its politics. 
Yet, as much as MacKinnon's account is in need of postmodern 
renovation, much is worth retaining. The great strength of the work is 
its unrelenting attention to power and its insidious operation. For her, 
the question of oppression is not about race and gender, but about 
racism and sexism. Inequality is not a question of difference, but of 
dominance: "the issue of discrimination or inequality is not centrally 
one of accurate categorization [but it] is one of hierarchy, the top and 
bottom of a hierarchy are different all right, but that is hardly all. "24 
She is uncompromising in her view that it is male and white 
supremacy that must be confronted as a political phenomenon rather 
than as a moral dilemma. She insists that the attempt to give women a 
voice of their own will not be possible until substantive change is made 
in social arrangements as well as in people's way of thinking because, 
at present, "his foot is on her throat."25 
For MacKinnon and her modernist kin, the flirtation with the 
postmodernist perspective is a liaison dangereuse. The essentialist le-
anings of their standpoint epistemology have been relatively successful 
in effecting legal reforms, in facilitating the entry of feminists into the 
"malestream" academy and in obliging its scholarly practitioners to 
take feminism seriously. Accordingly, some maintain that feminists 
"cannot afford not to be essentialist."26 Any postmodernistic conces-
sions, these feminists argue, will simply play into the hands of the 
white male establishment; there can be little prospect of liberation 
from patriarchy without a secure grounding in the possibility of a co-
herent self or a self-correcting reason. These fears are understandable 
and reasonable, but they are overstated and mistaken. Essentialists 
wrongly contend that postmodernism is a form of political betrayal 
that jeopardizes the integrity and solidarity of feminism. Moreover, 
they are unconvincing in their claims that significant realignments of 
power are probable within the existing protocols of power and knowl-
23. See Smart, supra note 11, at 208. 
24. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law -A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 
11, 21 (1985) (co=ents of Catharine MacKinnon). 
25. Id. at 74-75. 
26. Young, O/The Essential in Criticism: Some Intersections in Writing, Political Protest and 
Law, 1 LAW & CRmQUE 218 (1990); see also Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. 
REV. 829 (1990); Hawkesworth, Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of 
Truth, 14 SIGNS 533 (1989). 
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edge. It is the burden of the remainder of this essay to make the posi-
tive case for a postmodern politics. 
v. IN QUESTION? 
And so, returning to the question of how do we speak of woman. of 
gender, and of difference, I believe that the answer is carefully and 
contingently. 
- Brenda Cossman27 
The postmodern imperative entails no necessary program of polit-
ical action. Nothing necessarily follows from a rigorous nonessential-
ist mode of critique, least of all an essentialist dogma of correct 
politics. Postmodernists reject a belief in any single, accurate, or true 
vision of community or social justice; a deconstructive critique must 
not be allowed to become the last refuge of an essentialist scoundrel. 
There is no one true story to tell and all claims to knowledge must be 
tentative and provisional. Under a postmodern attachment, the details 
and priorities of a transformative program must be the continuing sub-
ject of healthy debate, respectful disagreement, and continual reap-
praisal. There is no place for an enforced orthodoxy or rigid 
conformity for "[a] just society is not a society that has adopted just 
laws, once and for all, rather it is a society where the question of jus-
tice remains constantly open. "28 , 
Rejecting programs and positions, the postmodern critic must at-
tend to the local and contingent circumstances of claims to knowledge 
and to the situated places from which people speak. Although reality 
is always multiple and never transcendent, a situated truth is no less 
real for being situated and not stable; the experience of self is simply 
not real in any metaphysical sense of true, objective, or complete. The 
idea and experience of self is never fixed nor final, but is always fluctu-
ating and formative. It is a site of constant struggle that cannot be 
worked towards, but must be workedfrom in the unfinished process of 
reworking. "Self" is neither separate nor separable from the constitu-
tive practices of social life that shape and are shaped by it. Whereas 
the traditional metaphysics of modernism aims to settle on an abiding 
identity in the competing relation of sameness and difference, a decon-
structive critique looks to destabilize the very possibility of grasping 
identity as self-presence. This is not to disavow identity, but to make 
its status always contingent and revisable. 29 The radical nature of 
postmodernism is its insistence that difference resides within identity, 
not outside it. 
The temptation for postmodern critics is to compromise on their 
27. Cossman, supra note 16, at 353. 
28. Castoriadis, Socialism and Autonomous Society, 1980 TELos 91, 104 (emphasis omitted). 
29. D. Fuss, supra note 10, at 102-05. 
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deconstructive rigor and to privilege a politics of experience. This is 
dangerous and unnecessary. Like everything else, experience is itself 
always and already the product and subject of interpretation; it cannot 
escape interrogation by masquerading as its own grounding. The val-
orization and privileging of "experience" is dangerous because it 
trades in the devalued coinage of a false authority drawn from a coun-
terfeit authenticity. By positing a shared or common experience for 
"women," for instance, it relies on reductionist notions of exclusion 
and universality that betray postmodernists' most basic beliefs. Expe-
rience is itself indeterminate and "[b]elief in the truth of Experience is 
as much an ideological production as belief in the experience of 
Truth."30 
Instead, there must be unflagging respect for the dialectical and 
dynamic nature of experience and the provisionality of any emergent 
conclusions. This is not to trivialize experience, but to devalue it as 
metaphysically relevant and to revalorize it as politically significant; 
experience is the beginning of any skeptical inquiry, not its ending.31 
There is simply no available method that can validate the knowledge 
of any individual or collective experience. No account can (or should 
want to) claim to be more deserving of metaphysical sanction than any 
other: the experience of men, women, persons of color, and so on, is a 
political assertion and not a metaphysical pronouncement. It is as im-
possible to be only a man, woman, African American, or white Euro-
pean as it is to be never a man, woman, African American, or white 
European. Experience is a melange of "the attributed, the imposed, 
and the lived."32 
Resort to a full-blown "politics of experience" is unnecessary be-
cause its proponents assume that, without such a base or foundation, 
there will be no way to galvanize or preserve the integrity and power 
of a political activism. Those who cling to such a belief have insuffi-
ciently shaken off the modernist mindset. Postmodernism is 
nonfoundational and nonessentialist, not antifoundationalist or anties-
sentialist. A studied antiessentialism is the mirror-image of essential-
ism and is always beholden to it for definition and thrust. 
Nonessentialism is not what essentialism becomes "when it imagines 
itself turned upside down. "33 As such, warnings of anarchy and nihil-
ism only have force within an essentialist frame of normative refer-
ence; such warnings imply wrongly that it is only because of the very 
30. Id. at 114; see also J. GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND FEMIN!Sf THINKING 85 (1986). 
31. See Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Move-
ment, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 603 (1986). 
32. D. RILEY, "AM I THAT NAME?": FEMINISM AND THE CATEGORY OF "WOMEN" IN 
Hl5f0RY 110 (1988). 
33. B. SMITH, CoNTINGENCIES OF VALUE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITICAL 
THEORY 151 (1988). 
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possibility of achieving the essentialist dream that such lawlessness has 
been staved off. 
Postmodernism is itself a contingent perspective that sees itself and 
all others as equally and unapologetically contingent; "the best thing 
to do" is always open to revision and reassessment. Its protagonists 
recognize that a thoroughgoing nonessentialism neither deprives nor 
endows people with a moral sensibility or political conscience. Its pro-
ponents know that there are no easy and objective answers, but only 
difficult choices; that law, tradition, and the like are not a solution in 
themselves, but are a resource in reaching a solution. They attempt to 
listen to and empathize with the plight of others, to retain a willing-
ness to rethink their own views in light of that experience, to put their 
own apprehended authority in question, and to initiate actions for 
which they are prepared to take personal responsibility. Judgment 
and action is about humility, not hubris. 
In the urgent struggle to combat the pervasive racism and sexism 
in society, postmodernists must work from the operating assumption 
that African Americanness or "womanness" has no essence. As 
Frantz Fanon so pointedly put it: "The Negro is not. Any more than 
the white man."34 The idea of African Americanness and "woman-
ness" offers no ontological ground from which to launch a political 
assault on racism and sexism; such categories are best destabilized and 
decentered. 35 This is not to slip into the error of suggesting that mat-
ters of racial or sexual identity are fictional or that the experience of 
racism or sexism is contrived. The postmodern challenge is not to 
dehistoricize so as to trivialize racial or sexual identity better, but to 
rehistoricize them so as to validate them better. To be against racism 
and sexism is an engaged act of political commitment, not an abstruse 
question of metaphysical authorization. To believe or act otherwise is 
to warrant the very racial and sexual essentialism that sustains the 
present institutionalization of racism and sexism. 
As Minow so powerfully demonstrates, domination has been per-
petuated and rationalized both by embracing difference (superiority of 
men over women and white-skinned people over black-skinned people) 
and by eschewing difference (treatment of women as men and African 
Americans as white Europeans). Taking difference seriously will be 
threatening - for some people. It means giving up a whole lot of 
advantages that are so deeply embedded in the fabric of society that 
they are overlooked and taken for granted. Many claim that they do 
not exist. These are the advantages that have made the establishment 
of power overwhelmingly white and male. Recognizing that African-
34. F. FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MAsKS 231 (C. Markmann trans. 1967). 
35. See Harris, Race and Essentia/ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 
(1990). 
1564 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:1549 
American, female, or gay people have different viewpoints forces the 
dominant white, male, and heterosexual people to recognize that they 
have points of view. Not the point of view, but simply one point of 
view among many. Moreover, it challenges the idea that whites or 
males have a monolithic voice; difference is within as well as between 
identities. It obliges them to subject those views to scrutiny, like any 
other views that no longer come couched in the accent of the eternal. 
Of course race, gender, and sexual orientation matter. It is not 
that women, gays, or African Americans possess any permanent, uni-
versal, or natural characteristics that differentiate them from white 
heterosexual men. Differences are culturally imposed and socially po-
liced. A formative influence in the cultural tradition of women, gays, 
and African Americans is their social and historical experience of op-
pression. It is not the fact that they have wombs, homosexual prefer-
ences, or black skin that is important, but the way that those with 
wombs, homosexual preferences, or black skin have been treated. The 
social situation of those discriminated against affects their view of 
themselves and their discriminators. This results in a cultural tradi-
tion that reflects a different experience and normative viewpoint. It is 
essential that these out-groups speak for themselves and analyze the 
conditions of their domination and its possible overcoming. Indeed, in 
contemporary society, it is more likely that "the dominated usually 
understand the dominant better than the reverse. In coping with their 
daily lives, they simply must."36 But this realization and its articula-
tion will be an active piece of political persuasion, not a contribution 
to a process of metaphysical clarification. 
While to deny entirely racial, gendered, or sexual identities is to 
fool ourselves and court complicity, to accept them entirely is to ig-
nore their ideological production and, therefore, the possibilities for 
their political transformation. It is as culpable to ignore difference as 
it is to dwell on it as an excuse to take it seriously. The goal is not to 
locate and give expression to the authentic voice of African Ameri-
cans', gays', or women's experience - this will ensure the continued 
dominance of white and male voices against which other voices will 
always vie for attention and whose importance will be reinforced at 
the very moment of their greatest threat. Nor must postmodernists 
engage in a neutral deconstruction in the name of a postgendered and 
postracial subject or a glorious refinement of the completed category 
of "real womanness," "gayness," or "African Americanness." The 
36. R. ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 189 
(1989). These comments raise the specter of the recent debate in the legal academy over the 
validity of racial critiques of the law on legal scholarship. See Kennedy, Racial Critiques of 
Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745 (1989). In this debate, I clearly take the view of 
Richard Delgado. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984). 
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notions of race, sexual orientation, and gender must always be treated 
as neither good nor bad in themselves, but as local and unstable sites 
that both define and are defined by struggles over their contingent con-
figuration and reconfiguration. Feminism and Afrocentricity are one 
kind of intervention in that contested process. 37 
The abandonment of any lingering essentialism allows 
postmodernists to concentrate on local conditions and their potential 
for constructive intervention, without being distracted by metaphysi-
cal preoccupations or ideological posturing. Although people are 
never not in a local context, they are never in a context that is not 
open to contingent revision. 38 Yet postmodern activists must be vigi-
lant to avoid essentializing the local or the political as a ground for 
action; local politics represents "only a fragmented set of possibilities 
that can be articulated into a momentary politics of time and place."39 
In this way, it becomes viable to resist the disempowering effect of 
affixing women and African Americans with the stigma of "victims." 
The failure to distinguish between the processes of victimization and 
women as victims is disabling: whereas the f.ormer allows for active 
resistance by victims themselves, the latter makes them into only the 
grateful beneficiaries of enlightened despotism. 40 By engaging in local 
37. I use "Afrocentricity" tentatively. Combining philosophy, science, history, and mythol-
ogy into an encompassing collective cognitive imperative, Afrocentricity is not a political ideol-
ogy, but rather a world view that places Africa at its center. It is a cultural recentering and a 
historical reclaiming of African expression and symbols. See M. AsANTE, AFROCENTRICITY 
(1988). Afrocentricity strives to be a transformative agent that focuses on attitude, values, and 
behavior and requires an epsitemological and ontological insurrection against Western hege-
monic practices, values, and discourse. For the most part, it is a positive program to facilitate 
cultural awareness, social reconstruction, and economic empowerment through the undoing of 
colonized thoughts. 
Like feminism, Afrocentricity is a way of talking about and being in the world and is invalua-
bly different from the dominant "point of view." Feminism recognizes the relations of power and 
privilege that have characterized the silencing and violence committed against women by men in 
a patriarchal society. Similar to Afrocentricity, feminism is not only a political ideology, but is a 
recognition of the "his-storical" erasure of women's contributions and importance throughout 
history: it highlights the appropriation of women's sexual, productive, and reproductive capaci-
ties for the betterment of mankind. However, Afrocentricity is different in that it is viable, in a 
postmodern sense, to talk about a precolonial African culture in a way that it is not entirely 
possible to refer to a prepatriarchal feminist culture. The life-way of American-Afrocentricity 
combines a precolonial culture with the experiences and values that have grown out of the his-
tory of indentured servitude in America and with the aspiration for a nonsexist society. Both 
feminism and Afrocentricity seek to reclaim a cultural identity in the process of remaking it. 
38. See Coombe, supra note 9. This effort to work the important space between the routine 
and the revolutionary, thereby avoiding the unnecessary obligation to either the universal or the 
local, is best represented in the work of Roberto Unger and his practical idea of internal develop-
ment. See R. UNGER, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); R. UNGER, PoLmcs: A 
WORK IN CoNSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY (1987). For a constructive critique of this project, 
see Hutchinson, A Poetic Champion Composes: Unger (Not) on Feminism and Ecology, 40 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 271 (1990). 
39. Probyn, Travels in The Postmodern: Making Sense of the Local. in FEMINISM/ 
POSTMODERNISM, supra note 9, at 176, 187. 
40. See Hunt, The De-eroticization of Women's Liberation: Social Purity Movement and the 
Revolutionary Feminism of Shelia Jeffries, FEMINIST REv., Spring 1990, at 23, 24. 
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politics, postmodernists might be able to open up a space in which the 
presently oppressed can reclaim their destiny and work toward a fu-
ture society that is truly egalitarian. 
VI. Go No MORE A-COURTING 
Designed for more modest waterways, the ship of judicial state-
craft has predictably been run aground by the rough seas of realpoli-
tik. However, like too much modem legal scholarship, Minow's 
proposals seek to salvage the adjudicative enterprise rather than junk 
it. Indeed, a major ambition of her work is to demonstrate that "the 
relational tum can offer law a new model for dealing with problems of 
difference" (p. 227). However, in keeping faith with the courts as via-
ble forum for transformative action, Minow leaves too much un-
touched and runs very high risks.41 In a sense, success would be her 
and society's worst enemy. If the judicial form changes, but the sub-
stance of decisionmaking remains the same, courts will make a bad job 
look good without altering its thorough badness. Admittedly, a trans-
formation in argumentative style might produce greater candor, but it 
has no necessary implications for the results reached. 
Indeed, Scott Altman maintains that candor is not all that it is 
democratically or morally cracked up to be. He proposes that "judges 
holding inaccurate beliefs about their decisions might decide better 
than they would with a clearer understanding of their actions."42 Tell-
ing the emperor that he has no clothes on is more likely to result in a 
redoubling of belief than in a feeling of liberation. In particular, Alt-
man argues that the indeterminacy thesis is self-fulfilling and politi-
cally harmful as, in a world in which most judges are conservative by 
inclination and inculcation, the demonstration that law does not in 
fact constrain is a dubious achievement and the expose of reactionary 
values will not lead to their official abandonment.43 Yet, rather than 
conclude that the very process of rule by the judiciary in a liberal de-
mocracy be abandoned, Altman advocates a continuing exercise in ju-
dicial disingenuity, stamped with an academic imprimatur. For 
Altman, on the other side of candor lies deceit and connivance. While 
Minow does not countenance such duplicity, she remains unnecessa-
rily attached to the transformative potential of litigation. 
Furthermore, history does not justify Minow's gamble that judges 
will take seriously the idea of empathic encounter and act upon the 
vocal challenge of previously excluded perspectives. Rather, it is 
likely to be used as one more device to reinforce and legitimate the 
41. This argument is given a fuller airing in Hutchinson, The Three 'Rs~· Reading/Rorty/ 
Radically (Book Review), 103 HARV. L. REv. 555, 578-83 (1989). 
42. Altman, supra note 13, at 299. 
43. Id. at 348. 
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illusion of a privileged reality and vision of justice.44 Her sincere but 
naive faith that argumentative style is more important than the ar-
guer's identity implicitly assumes that which she chastises in others -
judges decide as they presently do in large part because of their nor-
mative instincts and political assumptions. The intellectual act of 
making these instincts and assumptions more visible and self-con-
scious will not by itself change the decisions reached. Although the 
unveiling of these assumptions might spur greater reflection and moti-
vate an occasional change of heart, most judges will validate and ratify 
their informing visions; they decide as they do because of, not in spite 
of, their instincts and assumptions. Little suggests that the adoption 
of Minow's empathic proposals, unless accompanied by substantial re-
construction of socioeconomic conditions, will usher in a fresh era of 
egalitarian justice. 
Ultimately, Minow runs perilously close to falling into the same 
trap that ensnares Ronald Dworkin's misplaced optimism. Instead of 
projecting adjudication as a matter of principle, she wants very much 
for it to be a process of empathic encounter. Indeed, she eschews the 
resort to abstract principles because they "distract attention from con-
texts and carry an illusion of uncontroverted answers" (p. 322) and 
"portray a false simplicity among a rabbit warren of complexity" (p. 
370). Nevertheless, she remains content to keep strategic faith with 
the transformative potential of courts and to portray the Supreme 
Court as an "institution that calls some issues from the battleground 
of power politics to the forum of [empathy]. It holds out the promise 
that the deepest, most fundamental conflicts between individuals and 
society will once, someplace, finally, become questions of justice."45 
But it is just answers that we want, not pregnant questions of good 
intent. Unless and until there is a change in the ideological identity of 
society's decisionmakers, the answers given to the "deepest, most fun-
damental conflicts" will remain all too familiar and all too questiona-
ble. It is not increased empathy that is required, but a substantive 
reordering of empathic responses.46 
Progressive scholars must look for better and different ways to em-
power disadvantaged groups than constitutional litigation.47 The first 
step is to raise the critical consciousness of lawyers by disabusing them 
of their ingrained habit of resorting to the courts as the transformative 
forums of choice. They must become more sensitive to the debilitating 
44. See M. TuSHNET, TuE RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CoNSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1988). 
45. R. DWORKIN, A MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 71 (1985). 
46. See Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds? 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2113 (1989). 
47. For an extended development of such an approach, see A. Hutchinson, Begging The 
Question: Les Miserables Redux (1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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effect of extended involvement by courts in civic life. Nevertheless, 
while it is crucial not to exaggerate the contributions of courts, it is 
equally important not to overstate the democratic qualities of repre-
sentative institutions nor to deny entirely the possibility that legal fo-
rums could contribute to transformative struggle. The fear of 
cooptation must not lead to paralysis: the categorical denial of rights-
talk is almost as bad as its categorical embrace. Sensitive to the con-
tingent possibilities of any particular moment in social history and 
mindful that all struggle is already situated within mechanisms to be 
resisted and reworked, the only available strategy is to develop legal 
tactics that politicize and disrupt the courts as they use the mecha-
nisms in litigation. 48 The challenge is to engage in law and, at the 
same time, to delegitimate it by eschewing abstract notions of justice 
and rights in favor of concrete challenges. 
Secondly, progressive lawyers must develop a posture of "strategic 
skepticism" toward the efficacy of even limited use of litigation in the 
struggle for social justice. To direct the have-nots to the courts as a 
matter of course is to throw good money after bad. Nevertheless, in a 
political culture that gives a major role to litigation and in which 
rights-talk possesses a special resonance, claims phrased in the rheto-
ric of rights might be less easily rejected and might catalyze the mobil-
ization of popular struggle. It might be possible, for instance, to point 
out the frequency with which contemporary society fails to live up to 
its own expectations.49 
A program of "strategic skepticism" would be more the cultivation 
of a particular mindset and the refinement of various tactical tech-
niques than the establishment of a manifesto of litigable claims. The 
core idea is to act in a guerilla-like way .- within a broad set of pro-
gressive objectives, to seize the possibilities of any contingent moment 
in order to achieve judicial decisions that heighten the status quo's 
contradictions and open up space for lasting political action. It is im-
perative in pursuing such legal tactics that lawyers do not become in-
toxicated by the spirit of their own rhetorical excesses. To take the 
reasoning of the judges seriously is once again to validate the very 
institution that is to be subverted: it is to fall victim to the contagion 
48. For a power-oriented rather than rights-centered approach to law practice, see Gabel & 
Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1983); Glasbeek, Some Strategies for An Unlikely Task: 
The Progressive Use of Law, 21 OITAWA L. REV. 387 (1989); Smart, Feminism and Law: Some 
Problems of Analysis and Strategy, 14 INTL. J. Soc. L. 109 (1986). 
49. The record of the civil rights and abortion movements offers evidence of the limited 
successes (and dangers) of obliging the political and legal establishment to honor its own half-
hearted commitment to the universal dimension of rights-talk. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, 
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti-Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. 
REv. 1331 (1988); Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Ha•·e What Mi-
norities Want?, 22 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987); Schneider, supra note 31. 
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of traditional jurisprudence in which law thrives as a rational enter-
prise of abstract politics. It is only by maintaining a thoroughgoing 
skepticism to such talismanic tendencies and by recognizing the strate-
gic significance of such litigation in particular socioeconomic circum-
stances that the viability of any use by progressive lawyers of the 
courts can be sustained. 
VII. ABsENT FRIENDS 
If there is one motif that runs throughout the motley writings of 
the postmodernist crew, it is the insistence that constant attention 
must be paid to the time and place from which people speak. In the 
name of diversity and empathy, the ambition is to comprehend others 
as we would wish ourselves to be understood as individuals "with a 
concrete history, identity and affective-emotional constitution."50 
Celebrating the specific over the general and the situated over the ab-
stract, postmodernism particularly rejects the idea of the oracular in-
tellectual who pronounces global truths in a universal voice. Instead, 
the intellectuals' work should be informed by a solicitous sensitivity to 
the organic circumstances of the problem to be addressed and any so-
lution to be professed. In the postmodern playbook, situation-sense is 
always preferable to abstract reflection: the personal is political and 
the political is personal. 
A particular strength of M...inow's work is its unflagging application 
of this postmodern injunction; she is meticulous in her attention to the 
detailed differences of individual circumstances, social contexts, and 
institutional practices. Nevertheless, her text is curiously and con-
foundingly lacking in one central detail - Minow is nowhere to be 
found. In a postmodern manner of speaking, the author is only meta-
phorically present in her literal absence. Although she rightly lectures 
on the significance of subject-positions and their political valence, she 
does not put in any appearance in Making All the Difference. The 
reader is left with little idea, except by inference or supposition, about 
the subject-position from which she herself speaks. Unfortunately, she 
neither presents nor problematizes herself for scrutiny or reference. In 
her self-effacement, she manages to occupy a critical space that is both 
everywhere and nowhere: she floats over and through her text as a 
kind of postmodern phantasm. As a thinker of specificity, she remains 
paradoxically unspecified in her own concreteness. In so doing, she 
comes unintentionally close to invoking the presumed authority of de-
tached analysis and continuing the unconvincing ventriloquism of 
modernist thought. Contrary to her own postmodern desires, she re-
50. Benhabib, The Generalized and Concrete Other: The Koh/berg-Gilligan Controversy and 
Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRmQUE 77, 87 (S. Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1988). 
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mains unsituated and unseen. How and in what way is she different or 
similar to others? For whom does she speak? 
I want to emphasize that I intend to suggest by these remarks 
nothing suspicious or sinister about Martha Minow's identity of moti-
vations. On the contrary, in any personal or textual interactions with 
her, I have admired her genuine commitment to improve the plight of 
the disadvantaged. Indeed, I am sure that inserting herself into Mak-
ing All the Difference would not only enhance its methodological in-
tegrity, but would strengthen its political cogency. My point is that 
her absence from the text is simply puzzling in light of her own 
postmodernist concentration on the politics of identity and difference. 
Moreover, I want to take advantage of that oversight on her part to 
explore the implications of postmodernism for intellectual and polit-
ical practice. However, rather than engage in idle speculation about 
the terrain that is Martha Minow, it is much more pertinent to reflect 
on the "concrete history, identity and effective-emotional constitu-
tion"51 that makes up the individual known as Allan Hutchinson. As 
a member of the establishment by color, gender, culture, and sexual 
orientation, it promises to be more instructive. From where do I 
speak? From what standpoint do I squabble with Minow? What is 
my situation and subjectivity in the struggles over racism, sexism, and 
homophobia? What turf am I defending? 
For the postmodernist, these matters ought to be much more than 
of indulgent or voyeuristic concern. While persons are not reducible 
to their autobiographies, they never fully escape them; they forge their 
identities through the existential tension between confronting or con-
founding their autobiographies. Indeed, one of the first things that 
people like myself can and must do is actually begin to recognize and 
accept that they do have a racial, sexual, gendered, and cultural iden-
tity. It is an integral part of being a white, heterosexual, English man 
to not think of oneself in such terms. Race, sexual orientation, gender, 
and ethnicity are the burden of others - "I am simply me, but you are 
lots of different things." As Minow so astutely observes, for my stere-
otypic individual, difference is intrinsic to others and perspective is 
what others have (pp. 50-74): I am the norm because I am normal. It 
is this cultivated arrogance and metaphysical elitism that must be 
named and rooted out. Heterosexual white European men must learn 
to accept that equality is not simply about ensuring that everyone 
shares the same privileges, but that their position has always been one 
of privilege and was obtained at the expense of others. Affirmative 
action has been around for a long time, at least for white European, 
heterosexual males. 
As a white European, heterosexual man, it is important that I play 
51. Id. 
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a part in the struggle against racism, homophobia, and sexism: passiv-
ity is the unwitting ally of continued oppression. By recognizing my 
own gendered, racial, and sexual identity, I might begin to decenter 
my own experience and authority and make present this empowering 
absence. But any intervention must be self-consciously cautious. The 
challenge is to follow and not to lead, to learn to listen as well as to 
speak. In particular, I must studiously avoid the possibility of appro-
priating the experience of others and claiming to speak on their behalf. 
Similarly, I must not posit or empower the Voice of others, but must 
recognize that there are many voices that must be heard. In the pro-
cess of coming to know myself afresh in racial, sexual, gendered, and 
cultural terms, I can decenter myself both metaphysically and politi-
cally. In that way, I might be able to contribute positively and appro-
priately to the making of a community in which genuine dialogue and 
difference can become truly realized and respected. 52 
The goal is not to achieve justice on my terms: it is not toleration, 
but affirmation that is needed. The ambition is to strive for a future 
that is neither entirely white European nor African American, male 
nor female, heterosexual nor homosexual. But nor is it to establish a 
society that is a homogeneous mush of bland sameness. It is a mistake 
to imagine that the options are limited to handing over the establish-
ment to the presently disadvantaged or allowing them entry on the 
condition that they forget who they are and become the same as those 
presently in power. A society that truly seeks to become diverse must 
recognize that everyone will be transformed with the eradication of 
sexism, racism, and homophobia. Losing our identities as oppressors 
and oppressed, we will be able to meet as equals and celebrate the 
cultural diversity that makes each of us partly who we are and partly 
what we can become. It is in this aspiration and cause that people can 
achieve a solidarity that will make all the difference. 
Finally, I must recognize that the clearing of the postmodern 
throat at this particular time is not without controversy or skepticism. 
For some, it is highly suspicious that changes against essentialism and 
foundationalism should come at precisely the moment that other 
voices, previously silenced and stilled, begin to make themselves 
heard: "Should postmodernism's seductive text gain ascendancy, it 
will not be an accident that power remains in the hands of the white 
males who currently possess it.''53 Of course, the danger of 
postmodernism's appropriation and domestication by the establish-
ment is always a real and serious threat: no theoretical perspective is 
immune to such cooptation. Postmodernism is both liberating and 
52. See Hutchinson, Talking the Good Life: From Free Speech to Democratic Dialogue, 1 
YALE J.L. & LIBERATION 17 (1989). 
53. Hawkesworth, supra note 26, at 557; see also B. HOOKS, Postmodern Blackness, in 
YEARNING: RACE, GENDER AND CULTURAL POLITICS 28 (1990). 
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limiting to cultural groups that have been oppressed through a calcu-
lated misappropriation of Objectivity, Truth, and Knowledge by a 
white male establishment. There is nothing intrinsic to postmodem-
ism to prevent further abuse. 
Yet, as I have tried to explain, when pursued rigorously and 
responsibly, a postmodernist approach can be the most fitting and ef-
fective complement to a progressive politics. Progressive scholars 
must articulate the kinds of diverse society toward which we must 
struggle. Through such an enterprise, it might be possible to avoid the 
loss of valuable experiences and cultural truths that should be part of 
what is now believed to be an improved society in concrete but flexible 
and accommodating terms. Present essentialist strategies already 
work within rather than against the theoretical framework of estab-
lished power. The risk of complicity would not be threatening in a 
truly democratic society that was representative of all groups and af-
firmed the intrinsic value of all culture, race, gender, and sexual orien-
tation; self-determination, not majority rule, would be facilitated 
rather than frustrated by the state. Postmodern critique can help pull 
the political plug on the establishment and allow society to be galva-
nized by a different source of transformative energy. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Making All the Difference will not make all the difference, but it 
will and should make a difference. The difference that it does make 
will, like all differences, depend on the conditions into which it is pub-
lished and received. It will touch different readers in different ways. 
By contributing to greater empathy between lawyers and those on the 
margins of society, Minow has encouraged the creation of public open-
ings for the dispossessed to build their own culture for their own lives. 
This, in turn, might enrich and transform the lives of lawyers. Differ-
ent viewpoints must be valued for themselves and not as quaint con-
trasts to our own. Within this larger project, Minow's book 
epitomizes the contribution that the legal academic can make in work-
ing toward a legal system that is more democratic and less aristocratic 
in its practices and principles. 
As Minow strives to demonstrate, the dilemma of difference goes 
to the very crux of social theorizing. It is the burden and benefit of the 
human predicament that we cannot entirely shrug off our present iden-
tities any more than we can hope to liberate our one true selves: "No 
one is saved, and no one is totally lost."54 Through her tum to 
postmodemism, Minow reminds us and reassures us that we can 
. struggle individually and collectively to ensure that we forgo the 
54. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 171 (C. Smith trans. 
1962). 
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empty attractions of an essentialist metaphysic and make good on our 
own commitment and confidence in ourselves. In this way, 
postmodernism is not a submission to the dark forces of nihilism, but a 
call to energize our lives through dint of our own illuminating efforts 
at personal and institutional renewal. In her short years, Mary Joe 
Frug kindled a bright spark which, with care and attention, can serve 
as a bright beacon for all those committed to ushering in the dawn of a 
postmodern society. Martha Minow keeps that flame alive. 
